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A quantum seal is a way of encoding a message into quantum states, so that anybody may
read the message with little error, while authorized verifiers can detect that the seal has been
broken. We present a simple extension to the Bechmann-Pasquinucci majority-voting scheme that
is impervious to coherent attacks, and further, encompasses sealing quantum messages by means of
quantum encryption. The scheme is relatively easy to implement, requiring neither entanglement
nor controlled operations during the state preparation, reading or verification stages.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
a. Introduction: Before the age of electronic communication, important documents were often closed using a
wafer of molten wax into which was pressed the distinctive seal of the sender. This was meant to fulfil different
purposes, namely authentication of the sender as well as enabling the receiver to verify that the seal had not been
broken, and the message read, by a third party. Clearly it is meaningful to extend the scheme to the digital world.
Recently, Bechmann-Pasquinucci examined a quantum scheme for sealing classical data [1]. As with other related
quantum cryptographic schemes, such as quantum key distribution [2, 3, 4, 5], it relies on the characteristic features of
quantum cryptology, namely the no-cloning theorem [6] and quantum uncertainty to guarantee unconditional security
whereas classical systems can offer at best computational security. Specifically, Ref. [1] proposes a way to represent
one bit of classical data by three qubits out of which one of them (the seal qubit) is prepared in a diagonal basis
state (an eigenstate of the Pauli Xˆ or Yˆ operators), while the remaining two (coding qubits) represent the classical
bit in the computational basis (i.e., eigenbasis of the Pauli Zˆ operator). Using single qubit measurement along the
computational basis plus the classical [3, 1, 3]-majority vote code, anyone can obtain the original classical bit with
certainty. And at the same time, the authorized verifier, who possesses some additional information on the seal qubit,
is able to check if the seal was broken with non-negligible probability. This scheme was extended in Ref. [7] to the
case of quantum messages, using quantum error correction codes.
In this article, we present a majority vote scheme that guarantees an arbitrarily high probability that a reader
will unseal the correct message and is impervious even to coherent attacks of the type envisaged in Ref. [1]. It does
not require the application of any nonlocal (i.e., multi-qubit) gate operations during the preparation, reading and
verification stages and is hence fairly easy to implement. We believe that ease of implementability is of significance,
because if security were of prime concern, then quantum key distribution, whose unconditional security has been
extensively studied, but which can be difficult and expensive to implement, would be the appropriate way to protect
communication.
b. A modified scheme: In our modified scheme, a classical bit is still read using a majority voting system as in
the Bechmann-Pasquinucci protocol, but the coding bits are fewer than the sealing bits. That is, the fraction f of
coding qubits satisfies f < 1/2. We use the notation where {|0〉, |1〉} represent eigenstates of the computational basis,
and {|±〉} that of the diagonal basis. For example, let us consider a 5-qubit seal (in practice, the seal must be longer,
as we note later) with two code bits, so that f = 2/5 = 0.4. A bit value b can thus be encoded in any of the following
combinations, among others:
|1〉|1〉|+〉|−〉|+〉 code bits at 1, 2; b = 1
|0〉|+〉|0〉|−〉|+〉 code bits at 1, 3; b = 0
|−〉|+〉|0〉|0〉|+〉 code bits at 3, 4; b = 0
|+〉|−〉|+〉|1〉|1〉 code bits at 4, 5; b = 1 (1)
Further, the bit value encoded above is not a message bit: instead, each message bit is first split into shares according
to a secret sharing scheme [8] and it is the share bits that are sealed and transmitted. This ensures that the split-
shared bit can be recovered only by combining the shares in appropriate authorized combinations, and as clarified
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2below, improves security against illegal breaking of the seal. In a simple instance, the shares could simply be s single
bits such that their bitwise sum is the value of the message bit. Given s, a publicly known security parameter, each
message bit is classically split-shared into s shares according to a classical secret sharing scheme, in particular a (s, s)
threshold scheme. Further protection can come by embedding the share bit into the a classical error correction code
[9]. It is therefore understood that the majority voting scheme described below is applied not to the message bit
directly, but to the code bits derived from the message.
c. Encoding and verification by the sender: To seal a single code bit b, sender (sealer) Alice chooses n qubits. Of
these, a fraction f < 0.5 are prepared in the computational basis in the state |b〉. These qubits are the code qubits.
The remaining (1 − f)n qubits, which are the seal qubits, are put randomly in any eigenstate of the diagonal basis
(1/
√
2)(|0〉± |1〉). First let us see that this suffices to ensure that, with high probability, anyone can read the message,
especially, considering that the code bits are not in majority. By the large number theorem the expected number of
seal bits that if measured yield 0 or 1 is (1 − f)0.5n±
√
(1 − f)0.5n (i.e., a square-root statistical fluctuation). The
expected number of bits read as the intended, encoded bit is:
nfc ≡ n
(
f +
1− f
2
)
= n
(
1
2
+
f
2
)
. (2)
To ensure that statistical fluctuation should not drown the signal, we will require that f should be sufficiently large:
i.e., fn > 2
√
(1 − f)0.5n or n > n0 ≡ 2(1−f)/f2. Thus, for example, if we choose f = 0.4, the sealed message length
should be greater than 8 qubits. If we choose the more delicate f = 0.25, then the sealed message length should be
greater than 24 qubits. Conversely, given n, f > f0 ≡ (
√
2n+ 1− 1)/n. For example, if n = 40 qubits, then f0 = 0.2,
so that the code qubits should be more than 8.
This would seem to suggest that the larger is f , the better. This is indeed true for plainly breaking the seal and
reading the message. However, it also increases insecurity of a kind: suppose one randomly picks one qubit and
measures its state in the computational basis. The chance of knowing the message bit without being caught equals
pcheat = f + (1 − f)(1/2)(1/2) = (3/4)f + 1/4. In the scheme of Ref. [1], f = 2/3, so that pcheat = 3/4. By setting
f → 0, we obtain the limit cheating probability of this kind to be (1/4). In practice, in order to guard against
statistical flucatuations, f should be chosen greater than f0. Even a cheating probability of 1/4 is too large. However,
because of the secret sharing the probability that the cheater is caught rapidly rises according to (1− pscheat).
Suppose the message has been read by someone who measures all qubits in the computational basis. In order to
verify whether the seal is broken, Alice measures r ≤ (1− f)n seal qubits on known coordinates in the diagonal basis.
She checks that the outcomes match her preparation record. With high probability (= 1− (1/2)r) she will detect at
least one mismatch if the seal has been broken, and thus know that the message has been read. (In this work, we
ignore the effect of noise). Notice that after reading the message, a reader on average knows n(1− f)/2 coordinates,
where the minority outcome was obtained, to be the seal qubits. But he learns nothing of their original state because
of the no-cloning theorem and quantum uncertainty.
d. Intended reader verification: In the case of a classical seal, the receiver is familiar with the design of the symbol
pressed into the wax, and uses this knowledge to identify the document as authentic. This means prior knowledge
on the part of the intended receiver or verifier is required. For the present quantum seal, this part of the protocol
is obtained by Alice providing a distinct set of rj < (1 − f)n coordinates of the seal qubits and the corresponding
preparation information to each authorized reader. The authorized verifier uses projective measurements to determine
that the seal qubits have not been disturbed, leaving the code qubits untouched. He himself cannot read it because
he has information only on part of the seal qubits, and does not know which of the remaining qubits are code qubits
and which seal qubits. Let Rj be the set of coordinates Alice gives to the jth authorized verifier along with the
corresponding preparation information. In order that all verifiers should not be able to collude and read the message
without breaking the seal, we require that the union of their sets should be a proper subset of the seal qubits.
As a consequence, we have | ∩j Rj | < (1 − f)n. This will demand a sufficiently large number of seal qubits. An
alternative scheme is to give the verifiers coordinate information, and quantum information of the seal qubit states,
for performance of a non-desctructive state comparison involving a control-swap gate [1]. From the viewpoint of
implementation, these multi-qubit operations are more difficult relative to the plain projective measurements in our
case.
e. Security aspects: As pointed out in Ref. [1], a majority encoding scheme (with f > 0.5) will necessarily
be insecure against a coherent attack, i.e., one based on collective, incomplete measurement or a suitable positive
operator-valued measure (POVM) on all qubits taken together. The reason is that any encoding for a bit is orthogonal
to every encoding for the other bit. For example, in a 3-qubit seal with f = 2/3, the subspace of all states that can
encode for b = 0 is spanned by the vectors {|0〉|0〉|0〉, |0〉|0〉|1〉, |0〉|1〉|0〉, |1〉|0〉|0〉}, whereas that of states encoding for
b = 1 by {|1〉|1〉|1〉, |1〉|1〉|0〉, |1〉|0〉|1〉, |0〉|1〉|1〉}. Since these two subspaces are mutually orthogonal, an incomplete
three-qubit measurement can in principle distinguish them [1].
3In general, let ρb denote the mixed state encoding for code bit b as seen by a potential attacker. A scheme where
ρ0 and ρ1 have mutually orthogonal support is insecure towards a coherent attack. An important feature of our
scheme is that because f < 0.5, the supports for ρ0 and ρ1 are not mutually orthogonal. For example, in the partial
listing (1), the first and third vectors are not orthogonal to each other even though they encode for complementary
bits; likewise nor are the second and fourth vectors. Indeed, any valid encoding for a bit value (say 0) will be non-
orthogonal to (1−f)nCfn2
fn valid encodings for the other bit value (in this case, 1). Here we note that including the
mutually unbiased basis states of the Pauli Yˆ operator improves the above count to (1−f)nCfn4
fn3(1−2f)n. However,
the original, simpler scheme also suffices to guarantee unconditional (i.e., exponential in some security parameter)
security. To see that as a result the two density operators approach indistinguishability rapidly, we use a simple
measure of closeness between ρ0 and ρ1, the Hilbert-Schmidt distance:
d2HS = Tr
[
(ρ0 − ρ1)†(ρ0 − ρ1)
]
. (3)
To a potential quantum attacker who only knows f , the state encoding for a 0 bit is ρ0 =
(
nCfn2
(1−f)n
)−1
(|0〉〈0| ⊗
|0〉〈0| · · · |0〉〈0| ⊗ |s1〉〈s1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s(1−f)n〉〈s(1−f)n| + · · · ) where the summation runs over all nCfn combinations for
interspersing the fn copies of the |0〉 bits amidst the remaining (1 − f)n seal qubits, and the seal qubits can be
in any of the diagonal basis eigenstates (i.e., those of the Pauli Xˆ operator). For simplicity, we assume that the
eavesdropping attacker has knowledge of f , though in reality he can be worse off. Similarly, the state encoding for a
one 1 bit is ρ1 =
(
nCfn2
(1−f)n
)−1
(|1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1| · · · |1〉〈1| ⊗ |s1〉〈s1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s(1−f)n〉〈s(1−f)n|+ · · · ).
It follows that (ρ0− ρ1)† = (ρ0− ρ1) =
(
nCfn2
(1−f)n
)−1
(|000 · · · 〉〈000 · · · | − |111 · · · 〉〈111 · · · |)⊗ Iˆ ⊗ · · · ⊗ Iˆ + · · · ),
where the summation runs over all nCfn combinations for interspersing the (1− f)n copies of Iˆ (single-qubit identity)
operators amidst the n qubit slots. After some manipulation, we find:
d2HS = 2 · nCfn
[∑fn−1
j=0 [
(1−f)nCj ][
fnCj ]2
[(1−f)n−j][
nCfn2(1−f)n
]2
]
< 2−[(1−f)n−1]. (4)
where we arrive at the inequality noting that nCm =
n−mCm +
∑m−1
j=0 [
n−mCj ][
mCj ], 2m ≤ n. It follows from Eq. (4)
that the two states approach indistinguishability exponentially fast in n. Thus, no matter what POVM strategy the
attacker chooses, we can increase n to make the chance of detection via a coherent attack arbitrarily small. Further,
the layer of secret sharing means that the chance of launching such an attack and reading the message without being
caught is further exponentially diminished.
f. Extension to sealing of quantum data: The method given above works for sealing classical data. By combining
it with quantum encryption [10, 11], it can be used to implement quantum seals for sealing quantum data. Quantum
encryption works as follows: suppose we have a n-qubit quantum state |ψ〉 and random sequenceK of 2n classical bits.
Each sequential pair of classical bit is associated with a qubit and determines which transformation σˆ ∈ {Iˆ , σˆx, σˆy, σˆz}
is applied to the respective qubit. If the pair is 00, Iˆ is applied, if it is 01, σˆx is applied, and so on. To one not knowing
K, the resulting |ψ˜〉 is a complete mixture and no information can be extracted out of it because the encryption leaves
any pure state in a maximally mixed state, that is: (1/4)(Iˆ|S〉〈S|Iˆ+ σˆx|S〉〈S|σˆx+ σˆy|S〉〈S|σˆy+ σˆz|S〉〈S|σˆz) = (1/2)Iˆ.
However, with knowledge of K the sequence of operations can be reversed and |ψ〉 recovered. Therefore, classical data
can be used to encrypt quantum data.
To seal quantum data |ψ〉, we proceed as follows: (1) encrypt |ψ〉 using classical data K to |ψ˜〉; (2) seal classical
data K in qubits |ξj〉; (3) intersperse the qubits |ξj〉 amidst those of |ψ˜〉 according to some combination C; (4) seal C
using qubits |ηk〉. The total quantum seal for quantum data consists of the triple {|ψ˜〉,
⊗
j |ξj〉,
⊗
k |ηk〉}. We note if
the second layer of sealing were absent, and the quantum seal consisted only of {|ψ˜〉, ⊗j |ξj〉}, a malevolent intruder
could modify the encrypted data |ψ˜〉 without Bob or the verifiers being able to detect it.
In order to read the state |ψ〉, the reader must first break the first layer seal to retrieve C, from which he obtains
positional information of the qubits sealing the data K. He retrieves K by breaking the seal of positionally marked
qubits. He decrypts |ψ˜〉 using K to obtain |ψ〉. There are an exponentially large number of ways of interpolating
the K-sealing qubits amidst those of |ψ˜〉. Hence the potential attacker must first obtain positional information by
breaking the first layer seal, which will lead to detection with high probability.
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